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ETHNIC (IN)EQUALITY IN THE PUBLIC SERVICES OF 





The unfair distribution of public sector jobs is a common grievance in many societies, but 
arguably more so in ethnically polarized ones. Using census data from Kenya and Uganda, 
two countries with a history of ethnic conflict, this paper examines how public employment 
is allocated in multi-ethnic societies by studying the correlates of holding public sector jobs. 
The results demonstrate that the public services of Kenya and Uganda are first and foremost 
educational elites with considerably higher average levels of educational attainment than 
across the labour forces at large. However, when education is controlled for, high-skilled 
women and candidates from less developed districts are more likely to work for the state than 
others. As a result, public sector jobs are more equitably distributed along gender, regional 
and ethnic lines than education alone would predict. I hypothesise that formal policies to 
promote regional equity in the provision of basic services in combination with affirmative 
action measures are contributing to creating comparatively inclusive public services. 
 
HOW PUBLIC SECTOR JOBS ARE DISTRIBUTED is a contentious issue around the world, but 
perhaps particularly so in poor and socially fragmented societies. Whether on an ethnic, 
regional or socioeconomic basis, many believe that politicians will favour their own, by 
distributing public resources, such as public sector jobs, to their core constituencies. 1 
Academic literature has formalized such ideas by demonstrating when and why it is 
politically rational for leaders to use public resources to reward voters or appease opponents, 
rather than deliver broad-based public services.2 
These tendencies are thought to be particularly pronounced in ethnically polarized 
countries such as Kenya and Uganda. Voting in Kenyan elections is influenced by ethnicity, 
with candidates drawing their core support from their own ethnic communities. The disputed 
Kenyan 2007 election sparked an outbreak of ethnic violence that resulted in over a thousand 
deaths. Similarly, Uganda’s history of conflict over the past half-century is often analysed 
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through an ethno-regional prism. 3  Leaders and policymakers in both countries have 
themselves linked such conflicts to unequal access to resources, and in their aftermath they 
have sometimes sought to address these grievances head-on. Kenya’s 2010 constitution, 
written in the wake of the 2007/08 crisis, stipulates that the public service should be a 
‘representation of Kenya’s diverse communities’ and ensure equal opportunities to members 
of all ethnic groups.4 A 2016 diversity policy for the Kenyan public service recommended the 
use of affirmative action to ensure adequate representation of marginalised groups. 5 
Following the end of the Ugandan bush war the government began to use regional quotas in 
the army and police to address accusations of ethnic capture.6 
But how accurate are the perceptions of public employment inequalities that fuel these 
grievances in the first place? Findings in behavioural economics have demonstrated that 
human beings are poor at making statistical inferences from casually observed patterns.7 
Moreover, individual perceptions of employment inequalities are likely to be shaped by the 
distribution of jobs in a person’s local community, which may not mirror the distribution at 
the national level. Reporting in the media and by politicians sometimes sensationalise 
statistical evidence by citing ethnic group shares in public sector employment without 
normalizing by population, labour force participation or educational attainment.8 Empirical 
academic studies on the topic are few and limited in scope. The existing academic papers 
about Kenya and Uganda have examined ethnic shares among a small number of senior 
offices, such as permanent secretaries,9 cabinet ministers10 and the army corps.11 But such 
elite cadres may well differ in their ethnic composition from the public service rank and file. 
This paper in contrast uses census microdata to study the features of the public sector 
labour forces of Kenya and Uganda in aggregate. While senior posts may shed important 
light on political alliances and settlements, the distribution of public sector jobs in total 
provides insight into how state resources are shared across the broader population. Unlike 
surveys that examine public servants in isolation, these datasets also allow us to examine the 
characteristics of public servants in relation to the populations from which they are drawn. 
This sheds light not only on the nature of inequalities in public employment, but also on the 
mechanisms that drive them. 
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The paper finds that inequalities in access to public employment in Kenya and 
Uganda are less pronounced than what much of the secondary literature might have us 
believe. In both countries educational attainment sharply increases the probability of working 
for the state. Graduates from colleges and universities have historically, if less so today, faced 
little competition for public sector jobs. Among the highly educated, moreover, women and 
candidates from less developed parts of their respective country are more likely to work for 
the government than others. This has the effect of making the public service more socially, 
regionally and ethnically equitable than educational attainment alone would predict. 
Consequently, ethnic inequalities in public sector job access are not enormous. With one 
exception, the presidency of Daniel Arap Moi in Kenya, there is little evidence of an 
employment advantage for coethnics of past or current presidents. It follows that the number 
of people that would stand to benefit from a more ethnically or regionally equitable 
distribution of jobs is relatively small. 
The paper is organised as follows. It first reviews the theoretical literature about 
public resource distribution in Africa. It then provides a brief sketch of the history of public 
sector employment and human resource institutions in the two countries. This is followed by 
an analysis of census data from the 2000s, which is used to examine educational, gender, 
ethnic and regional inequalities in job access in Kenya and Uganda. The last section 
concludes by relating these empirical findings to the theoretical predictions. 
Theories of public employment and inequality in Africa 
 
Various theories have been put forward to explain how governments in Africa distribute 
public sector job and the inequalities that this generates. Literature from the early 
independence period framed the debate in class terms, asking whether high-earning public 
sector employees formed a nascent, exploitative class.12 Some assumed that the institutional 
structures in postcolonial states would be shaped to suit the interests of its incumbents. Public 
servants would establish educational barriers to job access that limited entry to those with 
high educational attainment, ensuring that public services were staffed by the children of the 
existing educational elite. To the extent that wealth and educational attainment was unevenly 
distributed during the colonial era, this class-based structure would exacerbate existing 
structural inequalities between regions and ethnic groups.13  
In more recent decades researchers have moved away from a class-based lens and 
instead characterised African bureaucracies as clientelist or patronage-based. This literature 
describes public employment as an instrument, controlled by politicians, that can be used to 
buy the support of politically influential individuals or groups. Kitschelt and Wilkinson and 
Hicken define clientelism as a ‘contingent exchange’, where a client is rewarded with a 
public sector job or other benefit in exchange for delivering votes or other forms of political 
                                                        
12 Frantz Fanon, The wretched of the earth (Grove Weidenfeld, New York, 1963); P.C. Lloyd, The new elite of 
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support.14 If the client does not deliver the requisite support, the patron can withdraw the 
job.15 Clientelism in Africa is thought to be organised along ethnic lines, as ethnicity provides 
the trust and social sanctioning mechanisms that enable the exchange.16 Ethnic leaders will 
use state resources to reward trusted members of their own ethnic groups who will in turn 
share resources with coethnics further down the chain, creating cascading, ethnically-based 
patron-client networks.17 Clientelism is expected to lead to a public service staffed by people 
ill-suited for their official responsibilities and skewed towards politically-influential 
individuals or groups, be it ethnic or otherwise.  
A related literature considers ethnic favouritism. Although this literature often 
employs the term patronage, many use the concept in a loose sense to describe the targeting 
of state resources towards favoured ethnic, religious or regional groups, but without 
necessarily requiring that the patron targets specific individuals, monitors compliance or 
sanctions misbehaviour. Ethnic favouritism need therefore not be antithetical to merit. A 
politician may favour an ethnic group by placing schools, roads or factories in its geographic 
locality, but the benefits of said resource may be competitively allocated among all 
residents.18 
In this vein, several recent papers have examined whether coethnics of past or present 
presidents in Africa have received a disproportionate share of public goods and services, be it 
education, health care or roads, and many find that indeed they do.19 The Kenyan government 
has even conducted a special investigation into ethnic equity in state employment. Since 2011 
the National Cohesion and Integration Commission has undertaken a series of ethnic audits of 
public sector institutions to determine whether jobs are distributed fairly.20 It similarly found 
that the ethnic groups of past or present presidents are overrepresented relative to their 
population share, although because it used statistics from the public service, it lacked the 
broader population data against which to carefully normalize these ethnic shares. 
In contrast to the expectation that leaders will reward their own supporters, others have 
suggested that precisely because of the explosive nature of ethnic and regional inequalities, 
multi-ethnic societies sometimes go to greater lengths than others to promote horizontal 
equity in access to state resources. Azam has argued that to reduce the risk of active conflict, 
leaders in Africa can either deter potential rebels by investing in their security services, or co-
                                                        
14 Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, ‘Citizen–politician linkages: An introduction,’ in Herbert Kitschelt 
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networks and the case for democracy in developing countries,’ Democratization, 12, 5 (2005), pp. 704-724. 
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20 Government of Kenya. National Cohesion and Integration Commission, ‘Towards national cohesion and unity 
in Kenya: Ethnic diversity and audit of the civil service,’ (Government of Kenya, Nairobi, 2011). 
5 
 
opt dissenters by redistributing to them. 21  In his models this redistribution is mediated 
through the education system and public sector employment. Similarly, Francois, Rainer and 
Trebbi studied the ethnic composition of cabinets in Africa and found them to be surprisingly 
inclusive, with ministerial appointments allocated in proportion to the ethnic composition of 
the population.22  They interpret this as a strategy to stave off coups or revolutions and 
suggest that the members of these ethnically-inclusive cabinets will use the ministries over 
which they preside to extend flows of patronage to their respective ethnic groups. This may 
ensure a relatively equitable ethnic distribution of spending and employment in aggregate. 
While Azam and Francois et al. invoke patronage to predict an ethnically even pattern of 
spending, it is also possible that governments will turn to formal means, be it regional 
allocation formulas or affirmative action policies, to achieve such results. There are plenty of 
examples from across the region of policies adopted to improve equity in access to resources 
and economic opportunities in the interest of national cohesion.23 Kenya introduced a district 
quota system in its national secondary schools in the 1980s and began requiring provincial 
secondary schools to admit most of its candidates from the local area, thereby limiting 
competition in underperforming areas from students outside the locality.24 Kenyan teacher 
training colleges also used district quotas, which lowered the bar for students from 
historically underserved regions. Since 2003, Uganda’s government seeks to distribute 
roughly a quarter of university scholarships to candidates from underprivileged 
backgrounds,25 while in Kenya the official grade-point cut-offs for government-sponsored 
university and college courses are lower for women, minority and marginalised groups and 
disabled applicants.26 These governments have also used explicit hiring quotas and targets. In 
2008 Kenya adopted the National Cohesion and Integration Act, which requires that ‘all 
public establishments […] seek to represent the diversity of the people of Kenya,’ and 
prohibits public establishments from hiring more than 30 percent of their employees from a 
single ethnic community.27 As mentioned earlier, following the civil conflict in Uganda, its 
government used district quotas in the army and police.28  
In sum, the existing literature makes a range of predictions about public sector hiring 
imperatives in postcolonial Africa and the resulting employment inequalities. The class-based 
literature assumes that those groups with an income and educational advantage will hold a 
disproportionate share of public sector jobs. Where economic and ethnic cleavages overlap, 
this may exacerbate inter-ethnic inequalities. Clientelist theories instead views public sector 
                                                        
21 Jean-Paul Azam, ‘The Redistributive state and conflicts in Africa’ 38, 4 (2001), pp. 429–44; Jean-Paul Azam, 
‘The Political Geography of Redistribution,’ in Benno Ndulu et al. (eds), The Political economy of economic 
growth in Africa, 1960-2000 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008). 
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23 See for instance: Michael Kpessa, Daniel Béland, and André Lecours, ‘Nationalism, development, and social 
policy: The politics of nation-building in sub-Saharan Africa,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 34, 12 (2011), pp. 
2115–33; W. T. S. Gould, ‘Secondary school admissions policies in eastern Africa: Some regional issues,” 
Comparative Education Review 18, 3 (1974), pp. 374–87.  
24 Munene Mwaniki, ‘Mother tongue education in primary teacher education in Kenya: A language management 
critique of the quota system,’ Multilingual Education 4, 11 (2014). 
25 Connie V. Nshemereirwe, The relationship between pre-university schooling and university grades in Uganda 
(Unplublished PhD dissertation, University of Twente, 2014). 
26 The Kenya universities and colleges central placement service, ‘Placement processing’ (Nairobi, 2014). 
27 Government of Kenya, National Cohesion and Integration Act  (2008). Section 7(2).  
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jobs as rewards given to individuals or groups in exchange for overt political favours. The 
ethnic favouritism literature predicts that politicians will favour their own regions or groups, 
resulting in higher public employment shares among coethnics of the president. Others have 
argued that multi-ethnic societies will seek to prevent accusations of capture by dividing the 
cake into equal shares between regions or groups. These equal shares could be achieved 
through patronage (where leaders of each group are given control of a share of the spoils), or 
through formal rules and quotas. Large-scale microdata samples from the Kenyan and 
Ugandan censuses makes it possible to examine some of these hypotheses quantitatively. 
First however, to contextualize the analysis, the next section provides a historical overview of 
public sector employment in postcolonial Kenya and Uganda. 
The history of public sector employment in Kenya and Uganda 
The public sector human resource management systems in Kenya and Uganda have colonial 
roots. On paper at least, these institutional structures were designed to safeguard a 
meritocratic and rules-based recruitment system. Both colonies established independent 
public service commission in the late 1950s to manage the appointment, promotion and 
dismissal of public servants.29 Further service commissions were created at later dates for 
specific sub-sections of the public service, such as the teaching service, police, army and 
judiciary. Each service has a unified salary scale and qualification requirements by pay grade. 
The degree of local government human resource autonomy has varied over time. Both 
countries centralised the state administration in the 1960s and reduced the share of local 
government hires, but then reversed these policies in the 1990s-2000s. Uganda decentralised 
human resource management to local governments in the 1990s, delegating appointments and 
dismissals to local district service commissions.30 In Kenya the current constitution delegates 
the appointment of local government staff to local governments.31 Executive or autonomous 
agencies and public corporations, meanwhile, have the greatest degree of human resource 
management autonomy, although central governments retain some oversight over the creation 
of establishments and setting of salary scales. 
While many of the late colonial human resource institutions remain in place in 
recognizable form, the shape and composition of the public services has changed markedly. 
At independence these public services had a dualistic structure with a small number of highly 
paid officers in grades historically reserved for Europeans, while Africans staffed the low-
skilled and low-paid posts. The Kenyan public sector employed 160,000 people or roughly 4 
percent of the labour force at independence in 1963, and the Ugandan public sector employed 
95,000 people, or 3 percent of the labour force in 1962, the majority in the low-skilled 
subordinate services.32 Of these public sector employees, only 15 percent in Kenya (1972) 
                                                        
29 D. N. Ndegwa, ‘Report of the commission of inquiry: Public service structure and remuneration commission 
1970-71,’ (Kenya Public Services Structure and Remuneration Commission, Nairobi, 1971). 
30 Ole Therkildsen and Per Tidemand, ‘Staff Management and organisational performance in Tanzania and 
Uganda: Public servant perspectives’ (Copenhagen, 2007). 
31 Republic of Kenya, Constitution of Kenya (2010), Article 234. 
32 Calculated from: Government of Kenya, ‘Statistical abstract’ (Government of Kenya, Nairobi, 1974), Table 
223; Government of Uganda, ‘Statistical abstract’ (Government of Uganda, Entebbe, 1966), Table UP.1; Labour 
force estimated at 85% of the working aged population (15-64). 
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and 16 percent in Uganda (1967) had a secondary school certificate or tertiary degree.33 At 
independence in the early 1960s Africans held roughly a third of these mid- and high-level 
public sector positions.34 
Positions were Africanized rapidly thereafter. Already by the early 1970s less than a 
quarter of mid- and high-level positions were staffed by expatriates, and the share fell to 
negligible levels soon after.35 In tandem the educational attainment of the public service 
increased dramatically. By the 2000s almost 80 percent of Kenyan, and 58 percent of 
Ugandan public sector employees had at least four years of secondary schooling, compared to 
a ratio in the labour force at large of 26 percent in Kenya and 10 percent in Uganda.36 This 
was partly a consequence of the rapid growth in skills-intensive public services, such as 
education. Teachers today comprise 49 percent of general government employment in Kenya, 
and 57 percent in Uganda. 37  Moreover, because of the skills scarcity at independence, 
Kenya’s and Uganda’s public services developed a close relationship to institutions of higher 
learning. In the 1960s and 1970s both countries required graduates from publicly funded 
colleges and universities to work for the state for a number of years upon completion of their 
studies and offered a guarantee of public employment in return.38 This also helped to tilt 
employment creation toward mid- and senior-level positions.  
The level of public employment in both countries have oscillated, although they have 
always remained low by international standards.39 Public employment grew rapidly from the 
mid-1960s until 1980s, with a near a doubling in the size of the (non-military) public service 
relative to the labour force.40 In response to the fiscal crises of the 1980s, and with donor 
prodding, both countries implemented civil service reform programmes in the 1990s which 
reduced the size of the public service relative to population back to roughly the same level as 
                                                        
33 Calculated from: Government of Kenya, ‘Statistical abstract’ (Government of Kenya, Nairobi, 1974), Table 
221 and 233; Government of Uganda, ‘High-level manpower survey’ (Entebbe, 1970), Tables II-VI. 
34 Uganda 26% in 1962; Kenya 40% in 1965, calculated from: Uganda Protectorate, ‘Report of the 
commissioners for Africanisation 1962, Part 1: Africanisation, retenion of expatriates and scholarships’ 
(Entebbe, 1962); Government of Kenya, ‘High-level manpower requirements and resources in Kenya, 1964-
1970’ (Government of Kenya, Nairobi, 1965). 
35 Government of Kenya, ‘Statistical abstract’ (Government of Kenya, Nairobi, 1974), Tables 221 and 233; 
International Labour Organisation, ‘Manpower assessment and planning, Uganda: Project findings and 
recommendations’ (Geneva, 1979). 
36 Calculated from: Minnesota Population Center, ‘Kenya 2009 population and housing census, Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.3 [Machine-readable database]’ (University of Minnesota, 
Minneapolis, 2014); Uganda Bureau of Statistics, ‘Uganda National Household Survey 2005/06 [data set]’ 
<https://openmicrodata.wordpress.com/2010/02/12/uganda-national-household-surveys-ihs-unhs/> (April 2016). 
37 Calculated from: Government of Kenya, ‘Statistical abstract’ (Government of Kenya, Nairobi, 2013), Table 
182(b); Uganda Bureau of Statistics, ‘Statistical abstract’ (Government of Uganda, Kampala, 2014), Table 2.3H. 
38 For discussion see: Government of Kenya, ‘Economic management for renewed growth,’ (Sessional Paper, 
Nairobi, 1986); International Labour Organisation, 'Wages, income policies and employment in Uganda: 
Agenda for institutional reform,' (ILO, Addis Ababa, 1989). 
39 For a regional comparison see: Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, Giulio de Tommaso, and Amitabha Mukherjee, 
‘Government employment and pay: A global and regional perspective,’ (Policy Research Working Papers, 
World Bank, Washington D.C., 1997). 
40 Calculated from: Government of Kenya, ‘Statistical abstract’ (Nairobi), vols. 1960-2010; Government of 
Uganda, ‘Statistical abstract’ (Entebbe), vols. 1960-1974; Uganda 1990 estimate: Mary Goretti Sendyona, 
'Public service restructuring and pay reform,' in Florence Kuteesa, et al. (eds) Uganda’s economic reforms: 
Insider accounts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010). 
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at independence.41 The public sector share of the labour force is today roughly 4 percent in 
Kenya (roughly 620,000 people) and 2.5 percent in Uganda (roughly 260,000 people).42 
Public sector wages followed an inverse trend to that of employment. Average real 
earnings in the public sector fell sharply between the 1970s and early 1990s while the salary 
scale was compressed, lowering the differentials between low and high skilled.43 With the 
structural reforms of the 1990s earnings began to recover and earnings differentials increased 
once more.  
Throughout the period, however, public servants remained a comparatively privileged 
strata of the labour force.44 Whether this was solely a consequence of their higher educational 
attainment or represents a public sector wage premium remains debated. A 2013 Kenyan 
study comparing public and private sector earnings conclude that public servants in senior 
roles and professional cadres receive a wage premium, while those in lower-level 
professional posts (particularly education and health) face a wage penalty.45 A study from 
Uganda argued that in comparison with the informal sector, which is the most likely 
alternative employment sector for many public sector employees, the public service offers a 
better total package, particularly once benefits, pensions and working conditions are 
considered.46 Who then, occupy these privileged positions in the public sector? Has the face 
of the public service changed over successive cohorts as the employment and wage 
conditions changed? Using available census data we can examine this quantitatively.  
Method and data 
The census data allows us to compare the characteristics of public sector employees against 
the entire labour force. I use census data from Kenya (2009)47 and Uganda (2002)48, obtained 
from the Minnesota Population Center’s Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), 
which makes available a 10 percent representative sample from these censuses for use by 
researchers. As a quality check I also present some results from the smaller Ugandan 2006 
national household survey.49 Unfortunately, the most recent Ugandan census data (2014) has 
not yet been released to researchers, and this analysis therefore builds on data from the early 
2000s. However, Ugandan politics of patronage or elite reproduction are presumably not new 
phenomena, and should still be valuable to study for an earlier period.  
                                                        
41 Sendyona, 'Public service restructuring’; I. M. Mbeche and H. M. Kataka, ‘The downsizing model in the 
Kenya civil service: Does it work?,’ Business Management Review 4, 2 (1997), pp. 32-47. 
42 In 2010, calculated from: Government of Kenya, ‘Statistical abstract’ (Government of Kenya, Nairobi, 2013), 
Table 182; Government of Uganda, ‘Statistical abstract’ (Government of Uganda, Kampala, 2014), Table 2.3H. 
43 Damiano Kulundu Manda, ‘Incentive structure and efficiency in the Kenyan civil service,’ (Discussion Paper, 
UNU/WIDER, 2001); Sendyona, ‘Public service restructuring.’ 
44 Rebecca Simson, ‘The rise and fall of Africa’s bureaucratic bourgeoisie: Public employment and the income 
elites of postcolonial Kenya and Tanzania,’ (Intenational Inequalities Instiute Working Paper Series, London, 
2017). 
45 Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, ‘A comparative study on public-private sector wage 
differentials in Kenya,’ (KIPPRA Policy Paper, Nairobi, 2013). 
46 Therkildsen and Tidemand, ‘Staff Management’. 
47 Minnesota Population Center, ‘Kenya 2009 population and housing census’. 
48 Minnesota Population Center, ‘Uganda 2002 population and housing census’. 
49 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, ‘Uganda national household survey 2005/06’. 
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With this data I construct a binary logistic model that specifies the (log) odds of 
holding a public sector job, conditional on the following variables: 
log(P(yi = 1)/ P(yi = 0)) = α + β1x1i + β2x2i … + βkxki  
y: Public employee (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
x1: Level of education (1 = none or some primary, 2 = primary, 3 = secondary, 4 = 
college, 5 = university) 
x2: Age (in years) 
x2 # x2: Quadratic age effect 
x3: Sex (1 = female, 0 = male) 
x1 # x2: education # age interaction term 
x1 # x3: education # gender interaction term 
x4: ethnicity dummies 
x5: district of birth characteristics 
I limit the sample to Kenyan/Ugandan-born labour force participants between the ages 
25 – 55, who have completed their schooling.50 Labour force participants are defined as those 
engaged in an economic activity, whether in the formal or informal sector, or who are 
unemployed and seeking work. Within this sample I seek to identify all individuals who work 
for the public sector. In the Kenya case this is a straightforward exercise as the Kenyan 
census asked respondents about their sector of employment. Respondents could select 
between four different public service categories: central government, local government, 
teacher’s service and state-owned enterprises. The Ugandan census lacks a sectoral 
breakdown of employment but the respondent’s ‘industry of employment’ include the 
categories ‘public service’, ‘education’ and ‘health’, and a detailed occupational classification 
allows further differentiation between teachers, health workers, soldiers and policemen. I 
treat the composite of these groups as a proxy for public employment. Note however that this 
measure excludes parastatal employees and those government employees in the agricultural 
or construction sectors, and includes some private sector teachers and health workers. I 
therefore use the smaller 2006 national household survey, which contains a precise public 
sector employment variable, to corroborate some of the main results. 
In this model age is treated as a measure for likely year of entry into the public service 
as this allows us to examine how employment opportunities have changed over time. 
Respondents may of course have entered the public sector mid-career, but survey data 
suggests that this is the exception rather than rule, at least in Kenya. The Kenyan 1994 
household survey shows a strong correlation between age and years in current employment 
among public sector employees (R=0.76). 51 Studies of the public services of East Africa also 
highlight that dismissals or resignations are relatively uncommon, with people usually 
leaving the public service at retirement or death.52 
                                                        
50 An age floor of 25 was used to exclude cohorts where many have still to complete their formal education, and 
a ceiling of 55 because this was until recently the official public sector retirement age. 
51 Author’s calculation based on: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. ‘Welfare monitoring survey 1994, second 
round [data set]’ (Nairobi, 2012). 
52 Therkildsen and Tidemand, ‘Staff management’. 
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Ethnic identity is extrapolated from the census data. The Ugandan census data coded 
individuals by ethnic group. The analysis considers the 12 largest Ugandan ethnic groups 
individually (~75 percent of the population) and a composite group of all remaining smaller 
ethnic groups. The Kenyan census sample does not include an ethnic variable so respondents’ 
counties of birth are used to construct an ethnicity proxy.53 Respondents are assigned to the 
ethnic group that dominates his or her county of birth.54 If no group constitutes more than 50 
percent of the county population it is coded as ‘mixed’ instead (see Appendix B). The ethnic 
dummy variable thus covers 11 different ethnic categories, the mixed group, as well as a 
group of all smaller ethnicities. Note that the mixed category is predominantly comprised of 
respondents born in the two main urban centres, Nairobi and Mombasa. 
Following the literature on ethnic favouritism in Africa, we are interested in whether 
coethnics of past or current Presidents are over-represented in the public service. Two of the 
Ugandan ethnic groups have had coethnic presidents in the recent past: the Langi (President 
Obote), and the Banyankole (President Museveni). Kenya also has two ethnic groups with 
coethnic presidents in the postcolonial era: The Kikuyu (Presidents Kenyatta and President 
Kibaki) and the Kalenjin (President Moi).  
With the restrictions just discussed we are left with a sample of roughly 940,000 
labour force participants in Kenya and 440,000 in Uganda.55 Of these, 6 percent and 7 percent 
worked in the public sectors of Kenya and Uganda respectively. In both countries the public 
services are male dominated; women comprise 37 percent of Kenyan and 30 percent of 
Ugandan public sector employees. Public servants also have a higher average educational 
attainment than the labour forces at large. The average Kenyan in our sample has a primary 
school degree, while the average for the public service sample lies between a secondary and 
college education. The average Ugandan labour force participant has less than a primary 
school degree while the average public servant has a secondary school education. More 
discussion of the variables and details of their construction are provided in Appendix B. 
To what extent do educational qualifications determine public sector job access? 
 
Given these educational differences between public and private labour forces, how does 
education affect the probability of working in the public sector? Figure 1 estimates this 
probability by educational level and age cohort while the full regression results are given in 
Appendix A, Table 2. Unsurprisingly the results show that level of educational attainment 
makes a big difference to a person’s likelihood of working for the state, particularly among 
the older respondents. In 2009, a 55-year old university-educated Kenyan had a 57 percent 
probability of holding a job in the public sector while a Ugandan had a 52 percent probability 
(2002). Put a different way, this model predicts that for every 100 university educated 
Kenyans born in the mid-1950s who remained active in the labour force in 2009, 57 of them 
worked for the state. Workers with college certificates (many of whom are teachers), are also 
                                                        
53 Data on county ethnic composition from: U. Wiesmann, B. Kiteme, and Z.  Mwangi, ‘Socio-economic atlas of 
Kenya: Depicting the national population census by county and sub-location,’ (KNBS, CETRAD, CDE, 
Nairobi, Nanyuki, Bern, 2014), p. 57.   
54 This approach is similar to that of: Burgess et al., 'The value of democracy.’; Lara Tobin, Essais sur 
l'urbanisation en Afrique Subsaharienne (Paris School of Economics,Unplublished PhD dissertation, 2015). 
55 Summary statistics are available in Appendix A, Table 1. 
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very likely to hold a public sector job, with estimated probabilities of 58 percent in Kenya 
and 45 percent in Uganda for this same age cohort. Among those with lower educational 
attainment the likelihood of working in the public sector drops substantially. Among the 
secondary educated roughly one in five are employed in the public sector (19 and 18 percent 
probability in Kenya and Uganda respectively), and among those with only primary 
education the ratio drops to below one in twenty (4 percent probability in both countries). 
In Kenya the share of workers employed in the public sector is smaller among 
younger employees. While 57 percent of university educated Kenyans born in mid-1950s 
worked in the public sector, only around 30 percent of labour force participants born around 
1980 did. This pattern is also evident among college and secondary school graduates. This is 
likely the result of the rationalisation of public sector employment in the 1990s as the 
education system continued to expand, which increased the number of qualified candidates in 
relation to the state’s absorption capacity. 
In Uganda the likelihood of working for the public sector differs less with the age of 
the respondent. This probably reflects the more comprehensive reform of the Ugandan public 
service after President Museveni came to power in 1986 along with the expansion of the 
teaching service, which seems to have created more space for recent graduates to find public 
sector jobs.56 It seems likely, however, that more recent censuses will reveal a pattern akin to 
the Kenyan one. Since the 1990s Uganda’s tertiary education system has expanded at a 
considerably faster pace than the public service. 
The model also provides some interesting results in regard to gender. Overall women 
are less likely to be employed by the public sector than men (all else being equal), but this is 
driven by a disproportionate share of men among low-skilled workers. Women with college 
or university education, in contrast, have a higher probability of working for the state than 
men with the same educational qualifications. This is consistent with the pattern in Europe 
and North America, which reflect the state’s high demand for traditionally female professions 
such as nursing, teaching and childcare. Yet a female bias usually signifies the comparatively 
low rather than high social status of a profession.57 
As discussed above, the Ugandan results rely on an imprecise measure of public 
employment that captures only employees in public administration, education, health and 
security. As a quality check I therefore replicate this analysis using data from household 
survey samples from 2006 where the public sector variable is precisely defined (see Figure 
1). Although this raises the confidence intervals considerably as the sample is smaller, it 
gives estimates roughly consistent with the census results. 
Another potential concern with these results is that they do not account for effects of 
migration. It is possible that those skilled graduates who failed to secure government 
employment instead chose to emigrate. But an examination of the emigration data suggests 
that migration was not on a large enough scale to substantially alter these ratios. Appendix C 
provides details on migration to Europe and North America, presumably the preferred 
destinations for the highly educated.  
                                                        
56 Sendyona, ‘Public service restructuring’. 
57 Asaf Levanon, Paula England, and Paul Allison, 'Occupational feminization and pay: Assessing causal 
dynamics using 1950-2000 U .S. census data,' Social Forces 88, 2 (2009), pp. 865-91. 
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Uganda 2006 National Household Survey 
 
Figure 1. Estimated probabilities of being employed in the public sector by educational attainment 
and age (95% confidence interval)
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Using migration data in combination with the UK and US censuses give rough back-of-the-
envelope estimates of the number of skilled migrants. It suggests that in the order of 5 percent 
of university graduates born in Kenya and Uganda may have left the sub-region during the 
1960s – 2000s. This is not enough to significantly alter the results above. Ugandans also 
migrated to Kenya in large numbers, but Ugandan graduates in Kenya were only around 1 
percent of the Ugandan university stock in 1999. 
For certain skill segments of the East African labour market then, the likelihood of 
working in the public sector is high, albeit more so among older cohorts than among recent 
graduates. Assuming that politicians sought to deliver patronage through the distribution of 
jobs, this emphasis on formal educational criteria severely limited their choice of candidates 
for mid- and high-level posts, throwing doubt on the relevance of clientelist explanations the 
broader distribution of skilled public sector jobs. In more recent years however, competition 
may have grown fiercer, potentially increasing patronage pressures. Given this, how have 
ascriptive factors such as ethnicity influenced access to public sector jobs? 
Ethnic inequalities in public sector employment  
 
Ethnic inequalities in the Kenyan public service are given in Figure 2a, which calculates the 
share of all working adults in each ethnic group58 that are public sector employed, ordered 
from highest to lowest.59 It shows that while almost 8 percent of all labour force participants 
born in Kenya’s ethnically mixed districts (including Nairobi and Mombasa) work for the 
public sector, less than 2 percent of those born in predominantly Turkana districts do. This 
wide range is largely due to two outliers with extremely low public employment shares, the 
Turkana and Somali. Yet their low shares seem likely to reflect structural inequalities rather 
than explicit discrimination. These groups both have large pastoral populations, low 
educational attainment, and in the Somali case was the site of a secessionist war in the 1960s. 
Among the remaining ethnic groups the shares vary a lot less; among 10 of the 13 groups, 
public employment shares range from 7.1 percent for the Kalenjin, to 5.1 percent of the 
Mijikenda, compared to a mean of 6 percent. 
In Figure 2b I examine the relationship between education and ethnic group public 
sector shares by limiting the sample to secondary-educated respondents. The figure measures 
the share of the secondary-educated members of each group that work for the public sector. 
This reverses the rank order and the Turkana and Somali public employment shares are now 
the highest. Thirty-three percent of all secondary educated Turkana respondents and 31 
percent of all secondary educated Somali respondents are employed in the public sector, 
compared to a national average of 17 percent. The Kikuyu, Kisii and 'mixed' counties, the 
three groups with the highest educational attainment, now have public employment shares 
well below the national average. The Kalenjin (Former President Moi's ethnic group) are 
something of an outlier with a high share on both measures, a point to which we will return.  
                                                        
58 These categories will be referred to as ethnic groups, but keeping in mind that the Kenyan groupings are 
based on ethnic shares in the district in which the respondent was born rather than self-reported ethnic identity. 
59 Appendix A, Table 6 provides the detailed data underlying these figures. Appendix A, Table 3 provides 
regression results that include ethnic group dummies, which shows that these ethnic differences are for the most 
part statistically significant. 
14 
 
Taken together, this evidence suggests that ethnic inequalities in job access are largely 
a function of unequal educational attainment. But conditional on educational attainment 
ethnic groups with low educational attainment are overrepresented in public employment, 
partially off-setting the unequalizing effect of education.  
 
2a. 
% of total ethnic group population 
2b. 
% of secondary-educated ethnic group population 
Figure 2. Kenya: percentage of working population in public employment by ethnic group 
The differences in public employment share across Uganda’s 12 largest ethnic groups 
are smaller than in Kenya (Figure 3a).60 Nine of the 13 groups have public employment 
shares within one percentage point of the mean. The outliers are two ethnic groups with 
unusually large shares: the Acholi and Iteso. Acholiland and Teso were sites of uprisings 
against the Museveni government in the 1980-90s and suffered from continued insecurity in 
the early 2000s.61 In 2001 it was estimated that three-quarters of the residents of Gulu and 
Kitgum (who are predominantly Acholi) were displaced and living in camps or protected 
villages, as were a third of the residents of Katakwi (predominantly Iteso).62 The presence of 
internally displaced people’s camps coupled with an international relief effort is likely to 
have increased government demand for workers in these districts, which may explain these 
unusually high public employment shares. Rather than withholding resources from regions 
that had historically supported the opposition (as the ethnic favouritism literature would 
predict), the government appears to have spent more on staffing in these conflict-affected 
regions. President Museveni’s coethnics in contrast, the Banyankole, have a public 
employment share below the national mean.  
Restricting the sample to secondary educated respondents reduces the measured 
inequality slightly, suggesting that educational differences explain some of the variation, 
although we do not see the same strong inverse relationship as in Kenya (Figure 3b). The 
                                                        
60 See Appendix A, Tables 4 and 7 for detailed data. 
61 There were several waves of conflict in these regions, but in 2002 displacement in Gulu and Kitgum was 
largely due to attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), while residents in Katawi were displaced by cattle 
raids by the Karamojong, see: Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project, ‘Profile of internal 
displacement: Uganda’ (Global IDP Database, Geneva, April 2002). 
62 Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project, ‘Profile of internal displacement’, p.6 & p.14. 
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group with the lowest shares are the Baganda, Uganda’s largest and best educated group, 
whose secondary completers have an unusually low probability of working for the state.  
 
3a. 
% of total ethnic group population 
3b. 
% of secondary-educated ethnic group population 
Figure 3. Uganda: percentage of working population in public employment by ethnic group 
We can also examine these ethnic group differences for different segments of the 
Kenyan and Ugandan public service, to see if these ethnic groups inequalities are more 
pronounced within the teaching force, general government, or other sub-sector alone.63 This 
analysis shows the rank order to be relatively stable across different segments of the service. 
In Kenya ethnic inequalities were lowest in the central government, followed by the teaching 
service, local government, and lastly the state-owned enterprises. In Uganda the education 
and health sectors have the most ethnically equitable staffing compositions, while the security 
sector is the most ethnically unequal. 
By assuming that age is a good predictor of a person’s likely year of entry into the 
public service, we can also examine whether ethnic group composition has changed over 
time. I calculate ethnic group shares separately across three birth cohorts: people born 
between 1954-63, 1964-73 and 1974-84 in Kenya, and people born between 1947-56, 1957-
66 and 1967-77 in Uganda.64 In Kenya the ethnic group rank order has remained relatively 
steady across these decennial cohorts, apart from the ‘mixed’ group which has risen in share, 
presumably driven by migration into the main cities. In Uganda the rank order has not 
changed substantially. In both countries the public service has grown more ethnically 
equitable over time, as shown by the lower coefficient of variation among the youngest 
cohorts. 
Ethnic group shares can also be segmented by gender. 65  In both countries the 
distribution of public sector jobs is more ethnically equitable among men than among 
women. As women are disproportionately found in the higher-skilled positions, and because 
ethnic groups with higher educational attainment are also those with a higher relative 
proportion of qualified women, the female public sector workers are more likely to hail from 
the educationally advantaged groups and regions. In effect then, gender and ethnic equality 
                                                        
63 Appendix Tables 6 and 7. 
64 Appendix Tables 8 and 9. 
65 Appendix Tables 8 and 9. 
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pull in opposite directions. An increase in the female employment share will, all else being 
equal, increase ethnic inequalities and vice versa.  
Ethnic favouritism for Presidential coethnics? 
 
Among the Kenyan groups, however, the Kalenjin group appears as something of an outlier 
with unusually high public employment shares in relation to its educational attainment. Given 
that former Kenyan President Moi is a Kalenjin, this suggests a possible effect of presidential 
ethnic favouritism. Keep in mind however, that for the other three groups across Kenya and 
Uganda with coethnic presidents, the public employment shares are below or on par with the 
national average, both in aggregate terms and when controlling for education. 
A way to test this is to examine whether the coethnic advantage is concentrated 
among those cohorts who would have entered the labour market during the tenure of their 
coethnic president. For example, do Kalenjin respondents who entered the labour market 
while President Moi was in power have a higher relative probability of working in the public 
sector than those Kalenjin who entered when the president was of a different ethnicity to their 
own? To do this I construct a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a respondent was of 
the same ethnicity as the president at the time when he or she was 25 (the average age of 
public service entry).66 This dummy is added to the logistic model, in addition to the usual 
controls as well as dummies for each presidential era (Appendix A, Table 5).  
This exercise shows that only the Kalenjin dummy is significant and of the right sign. 
The Kalenjin entering the labour market at roughly the time of their coethnic's presidency had 
a 14 percent higher probability of working for the public sector than at other times, all else 
being equal. Treating this over-representation as the jobs attributed to patronage suggests that 
roughly 1.2 percent of all public sector jobs in Kenya were unfairly allocated to Kalenjin 
candidates in 2009. While not insignificant, presidential favouritism appears to have had a 
marginal rather than dominant effect on the broader composition of the Kenyan public sector 
labour force. 
Birth place and access to public sector employment 
 
So far we have considered public employment inequalities on an ethnic group basis, but 
given that ethnic groups are geographically concentrated, the results are similar, if not even 
more marked, on a geographic basis. On average, being born in more central and developed 
regions of each respective country increases the likelihood of working or the government. 
But when regional differences in educational attainment are taken into account, this pattern is 
reversed. Figure 2 provides a heat map that shows the share of secondary educated workers 
employed in the public sector by district or county of birth. In both countries the levels are 
strongly correlated with distance from the capital city. Secondary educated workers from the 
most peripheral parts of each country are more than twice as likely to work for the public 
sector than those born in the capital cities. 
                                                        
66 This approach is similar to that used by Kramon and Posner, ‘Ethnic favouritism’, with regard to education. 
17 
 
 Distance from the capital in both Kenya and Uganda is correlated with the level of 
development in the region. In a series of additional regression models, I add other proxies for 
district level development in a respondent’s birth district. These measures include the average 
years of schooling, population density and the level of private wage employment by district 
(see Appendix Tables 3 and 4). In all three models the likelihood of public employment is 
higher for those born in less developed districts, once the respondent’s educational attainment 




Figure 4. Percent of secondary educated population in public employment, by district/county of birth  
 
Drivers of the distribution of public sector jobs 
 
What explains this higher propensity for candidates from economically disadvantaged 
districts and ethnic groups to enter the public service? One likely driver of this pattern in the 
geographic distribution of public services and by extension public sector jobs. In both 
countries public employment opportunities are more equitably distributed than formal private 
employment, generating jobs even in remote regions where non-natives to the area are 
unlikely to settle. As illustrated in Figure 3, across Kenya’s eight former provinces and 
Uganda’s four regions and capital city, the public employment to population ratio is 
reasonably even, apart from higher levels in the capital cities and a low level in Kenya’s 
North-Eastern Province. Table 1 calculates the range and coefficient of variation in public 
and private employment shares across districts and demonstrates that this variation is lower in 
the public sector. In other words, the district-level density of private sector activity is more 





In the absence of local private sector demand for educated employees in less 
developed districts, a higher share of secondary school graduates will likely pursue public 
sector careers. In more economically developed regions in contrast, promising students have 
a broader range of career options. Furthermore, while graduates from remote parts of the 
country often migrate to the centre, the reverse is less common.67 As a result, candidates born 
in the urban centres face competition from migrants as well as other locals, while candidates 
in peripheral regions face little migrant competition. 
In both Kenya and Uganda the coefficient of variation is lowest among teachers. 
Consistent with this argument, the teaching force is unusually geographically dispersed as 
teaching services are delivered close to the population. Furthermore, as the first few years of 
primary schooling are often taught in local languages, local candidates may automatically be 
privileged over candidates from other language groups, which may account for a particularly 
equitable distribution of teaching jobs.68 
Lastly, although not tested in this paper, it is also possible that greater discrimination 
in the private sector drives people from less privileged backgrounds into the public sector. 
Evidence from North America and Europe suggests that women and racial minorities are 
often over-represented in public employment and that pay discrimination is lower in the 
public sector,69 possibly because hiring and remuneration policies are more transparent and 
more likely to include affirmative action objectives. If members of more privileged ethnic 
groups or regions have a higher probability of gaining a more lucrative private sector job than 
others, then this will reduce the extent to which they compete for public sector jobs in the 
first place. 
 Quantifying the effects of these different drivers of public employment inequality is 
beyond the scope of this paper. The hypotheses discussed above are merely meant to show 
that typical public sector policy objectives, such as geographic equity in public service 
distribution or policies on primary school language of instruction, would result in precisely 
the employment patterns we observe. Further research is needed to firmly establish the causal 
mechanisms. 
                                                        
67 Separate analysis of the data shows a strong correlation between the degree of district remoteness and the 
share of public servants that were born in the district. 
68 Mwaniki, ‘Mother tongue education’; Mathias Bwanika Mulumba and Fred Masagazi Masaazi, ‘Challenges 
to African development: The medium of instruction in Uganda’s education system,’ Pedagogy, Culture and 
Society 20, 3 (2012), pp. 435-50. 
69 Robert G. Gregory and Jeff Borland, ‘Recent developments in public sector labor markets,’ in O. O. 





Figure 5. Percentage of adult population (15-65) in public sector employment, by province/region 
 
Table 1. Variation in density of public and private sector wage employment across counties/districts 
 % adult population (18-65) in 
employment Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Coefficient 
of variation 
KENYA 2009            
private  47 9.3 6.0 1.2 29.3 0.6 
public employment  47 3.7 1.2 1.1 6.5 0.3 
    Central govt 47 1.3 0.7 0.4 4.1 0.5 
    Local govt 47 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.2 0.5 
    Teaching service 47 1.3 0.4 0.4 2.1 0.3 
UGANDA 2002         
private 56 3.5 4.1 0.6 26.4 1.2 
public employment 56 3.6 1.5 2.0 10.8 0.4 
    Public services 56 1.1 0.9 0.4 5.0 0.8 
    Education 56 1.9 0.8 0.6 3.9 0.4 
    Health 56 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.6 0.5 
Note: Private sector definition: Kenya: based on 'private' sectoral classification and NGOs and faith-based 




The preceding sections have examined how education, age, gender, ethnicity and place of 
birth influences the likelihood of working for the public services of Kenya and Uganda. What 
does this tell us about the politics of public employment and the inequalities it generates?  
The first, and perhaps in hindsight obvious, observation is that the average 
educational attainment of Kenyan and Ugandan public sector employees is well above that of 
the labour force at large, as most public sector employees are teachers, nurses, administrators 
and other comparatively skilled professionals. We would expect, therefore, that long-standing 
regional and ethnic group inequalities in educational attainment should have a pronounced 
effect on relative access to public sector jobs. In the Kenyan case this is indeed the case. 
Inequalities in ethnic and regional public employment shares are correlated with educational 
attainment. The two lagging groups, the Turkana and Somali, have exceptionally low 
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secondary school attainment. Yet public employment inequalities are less pronounced than 
educational attainment alone would predict, as groups with low educational attainment send a 
larger share of those educational high achievers into the public sector. Structural inequalities 
matter, but not as much as might be expected. 
In Uganda the educational attainment differences across the 13 groups included in the 
analysis are smaller than in Kenya, as are the differences in ethnic group public employment 
shares. But as in Kenya there are some signs that the educationally-high performing groups 
have a smaller share of their educated members working in the public sector.  
This strong relationship between educational attainment and public employment 
access sheds doubt on clientelist explanations for the distribution of public sector jobs. The 
results show that once we control for the educational attainment required for mid-level and 
senior posts, the government has historically had few qualified candidates to choose between. 
Among Kenyans and Ugandans born in the 1950s and 1960s there are less than two 
university or college graduates per public sector post. Among the candidates with certificates 
or degrees in disciplines strongly demanded by the state, such as teaching, medicine and 
nursing, this ratio is presumably even lower. In effect then, such candidates were selected 
into public sector careers in the course of their academic progression. Assuming that the 
examination system that determined academic progression was broadly fair, this means that 
candidates were filtered on the basis of criteria that politicians did not directly control. This is 
antithetical to the type of personalised, quid pro quo clientelism described by Hicken, 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson and Robinson and Verdier, as it curtails the ability of politicians to 
hire and fire freely.  
Since the 1990s competition for graduate jobs may have gotten fiercer as the public 
sector’s ability to absorb graduates declined. While this could conceivably have created more 
opportunities for patronage, there are no signs that the ethnic or regional composition of the 
public sector labour force has changed markedly since. Ethnic group differences in public 
employment shares are in fact lowest among the youngest and thus most recently hired 
cohorts.  
A different strand in the literature argues that public sector resources are used to 
reward favoured ethnic groups or regions, without targeting specific individuals within these 
groups. This is expected to lead to an employment advantage for coethnics of present or past 
presidents. In both Kenya and Uganda, however, ethnic inequalities in public employment 
across the larger groups are not particularly pronounced and have not fluctuated notably 
across cohorts. The public employment to population ratio of the ethnic groups of the current 
presidents, the Kikuyu and Banyankole, are roughly on par with the national averages. Only 
in the case of the Kalenjin, the ethnic group of former Kenyan President Moi, are there strong 
signs of presidential favouritism. Yet the results suggest that this unfair Kalenjin advantage 
accounted for only around 1 percent of all public sector jobs in 2009. Although this 
overrepresentation may be more apparent in some subsectors of the public service than others 
and at the height of President Moi’s presidency, it seems doubtful that the average person 
could accurate gauge an unfair advantage of this magnitude. Moreover, given that the 
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Kalenjin had comparatively low educational access during the colonial era, this may be a 
specific type of case, where ethnic favouritism was fuelled by a sense of historical injustice.70 
Lastly, a fourth strand in the literature argues that ethnically polarized societies favour 
ethnically inclusive settlements, where jobs and other resources are allocated in rough 
proportion to the population’s different ethnic or regional groupings to avoid stoking conflict. 
This prediction is relatively consistent with the observed results. Both governments appear to 
be promoting some regional balance in service provision and by extension public 
employment. But while some of this literature takes for granted that this settlement is 
mediated through patron-client networks, I argue that formal rules and policies provide 
equally plausible mechanisms. Regional quotas, affirmative action and local language 
policies in schools could give the same ethnic employment patterns.  
This does not rule out the existence of ethnic skews at the highest echelons of the 
public service, as has been found in several studies about Kenya and Uganda.71 In such cases 
though, it is important to distinguish between politically appointed posts, such as ministers 
and commissioners, which are designed to give leaders the freedom to appoint party loyalists 
to strategic positions, versus the career civil service, which is officially meritocratic.72 Many 
of the posts considered in these earlier studies are appointed ones. Furthermore, much of the 
literature on patronage assumes that voters support coethnic politicians because they expect 
that doing so will bring benefits to themselves or their local communities.73 The findings in 
this paper suggest that conflicts and settlements among ethnic elites may not have much 
bearing on the broader distribution of public sector jobs.74 Thus the presumed economic 
consequences of political ethnic polarization may need more careful interrogation. 
These findings also point to a possible incongruence between perception of inequality 
and their true manifestations. Such perceptions may fuel resentment and political 
mobilization, or conversely, unduly increase support for leaders on the unfounded 
expectation that they will privilege their own community members. They can also create the 
unrealistic expectation that greater equity in job allocation would ameliorate local 
unemployment problems, even when an improved distribution of resources would benefit 
very few. To illustrate, one can calculate the share of public sector jobs that would need to be 
redistributed to achieve perfect equity in job access across the 13 ethnic categories used in 
this paper. In both Kenya and Uganda, roughly 6 percent of jobs would need to be reallocated 
from over- to under-represented groups to achieve ethnic parity. This is equivalent to less 
than half a percent of the labour force. In other words, this hypothetical redistribution would 
benefit one in 200 workers. 
                                                        
70 For a discussion of the differences in redistributive strategy when a comparatively wealthier vs. poorer ethnic 
group is in power, see: Azam, ‘The political geography of redistribution.’ 
71 Lindemann, ‘Exclusionary elite bargains’; Bangura, ‘Ethnic inequalities’. 
72 For a discussion of the institutional logic of political appointments, see: Merilee S. Grindle, Jobs for the boys: 
Patronage and the state in comparative perspective (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 
73 Carlson, ‘Ethnic voting’. 
74 For the argument that patronage in Africa is limited to elites, see: Nicolas van de Walle, ‘Meet the new boss, 
same as the old boss? The evolution of political clientelism in Africa,’ Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. 
Wilkinson (eds), Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007). 
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For the average Kenyan or Ugandan, particularly those with little formal education, 
the likelihood of being employed by the public sector is extremely low in any case. Ethnic 
group differences make a small absolute difference to an individual’s likelihood of gaining 
such a job. It follows from this that an improved ethnic distribution of public sector jobs 
alone is unlikely to diffuse ethnic tensions. A sober discussion of the actual allocation 
patterns that highlights the institutional mechanisms for promoting fairness may prove a more 
fruitful approach to managing popular expectations. 
 
